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Analysis and Control of Strategic Interactions in Finite Heterogeneous
Populations under Best-Response Update Rule
Pouria Ramazi and Ming Cao
Abstract— For a finite, well-mixed population of heteroge-
neous agents playing evolutionary games choosing to coop-
erate or defect in each round of the game, we investigate,
when agents update their strategies in each round using the
myopic best-response rule, how the number of cooperating
agents changes over time and demonstrate how to control that
number by changing the agents’ payoff matrices. The agents
are heterogeneous in that their payoff matrices may differ
from one another; we focus on the specific case when the
payoff matrices, fixed throughout the evolution, correspond to
prisoner’s dilemma or snowdrift games. To carry out stability
analysis, we identify the system’s absorbing states when taking
the number of cooperating agents as a random variable of
interest. It is proven that when all the agents update frequently
enough, the reachable final states are completely determined
by the available types of payoff matrices. As a further step, we
show how to control the final state by changing at the beginning
of the evolution, the types of the payoff matrices of a group of
agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
For over three decades, biologists, economists and sociol-
ogists have utilized evolutionary game theory to understand
how a certain level of cooperation can be reached among
selfish interacting individuals [1][2]. Such evolutionary game
theoretic models have proven to be promising in engineer-
ing network systems as well especially in the context of
growing applications of networks of autonomous agents
performing group tasks [3][4][5]. While simulation results
have suggested there are effective mechanisms to explain
the emergence and promotion of cooperation among self-
interested agents [6][7], rigorous mathematical statements
with proofs are still in great demand. Moreover, the existing
proven mathematical results, e.g., [8][9][10], usually assume
at least one of the followings: (i) an infinite population under
continuous-time dynamics, (ii) deterministic dynamics, and
(3) homogeneous agents. While these assumptions help to
simplify the mathematical setup and gain insight into the
theoretical aspects of cooperation mechanisms, an interesting
research line that has not been explored to its full potential is
to study a finite heterogeneous population of game-playing
agents under stochastic discrete-time updating dynamics.[7]
Interesting simulation results have been conducted for
heterogeneous populations in [11], [12] and [13] where the
agents are associated with different payoff matrices. Some
mathematical statements have been provided in [14] and [15]
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for the myopic best response update rule [15] but only for
the case when the population is homogeneous and the game
is symmetric. Some researchers have studied the stochastic
stability of different strategies in the population when the
update rule is noisy [16] [14]. Besides the results addressing
the stability issue of strategically interacting populations,
there is an emerging trend to investigate how to control
such populations. Different methods have been suggested
to control the number of agents with a specific strategy
in a decision-making population. For example, in [17][18],
the strategies of a group of agents are fixed to a desired
strategy for the duration of the game, in [19], the payoffs of
a stochastic snowdrift game are changed and in [20], some
changes in terms of an emission tax rate and the price of an
emission permit are applied to the payoffs of the agents.
In this paper, we continue our recent work [21] by
considering a finite number of agents, each belonging to a
type to which a (possibly unique) payoff matrix is associated.
At each time an agent is randomly chosen from the popu-
lation to update her strategy that is either to cooperate or
defect, according to the myopic best response update rule.
In such a population, we explicitly determine the number
of cooperators of each type after a sufficiently long time,
find the absorbing states, and clarify their stability properties.
Consequently, we show that based on the distribution of the
types in the population, the total number of cooperators in
the long run either reaches a certain steady state or fluc-
tuates between two constants. After presenting the stability
analysis, we investigate whether it is possible to control the
number of cooperators in the long run by changing the types
of the agents. Specifically, for a given population and types,
we find how to change the types of the agents to have a
desired number of cooperators in the long run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we construct the framework of our work and introduce the
population game that the agents are involved in. In Section
III, we provide the main stability result of this paper, and
explain the evolution of the number of cooperators in each
type of agent. In Section IV, we focus on controlling the total
number of cooperators in the population after a sufficiently
long time. It is shown how to achieve a desired reachable
number of cooperators in the long run by changing the types
of a group of agents.
II. POPULATION STRATEGIC DYNAMICS
We consider a finite, well-mixed population of n agents
that are participating in a population game evolving over
time t = 0, 1, . . . Each agent can choose either to cooperate
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(C) or defect (D). At each time t, an agent is randomly
activated to update her strategy according to how well she is
doing when she plays her current strategy against the average
population. More specifically, the four possible payoffs of an








where the payoffs Ri, Ti, Si and Pi are real numbers cor-
responding to strategy pairs C-against-C, D-against-C, C-
against-D and D-against-D respectively. Let si(t) denote
the agent i’s strategy at time t, which is defined to be [1 0]T
when agent i chooses to cooperate at t and defined to be
1 − [1 0]T = [0 1]T otherwise, with 1 = [1 1]T . Let xC(t)
denote the proportion of cooperators in the whole population





. Then agent i’s payoff at time
t against the average population is calculated by
ui(si(t), sC(t)) = si(t)
TAi sC(t).
The myopic best-response strategy update rule for agent i
dictates that agent i sticks to her current strategy if her
alternative strategy does not give her higher payoff, and
otherwise she switches her strategy, namely
si(t+ 1) ={
si(t) if ui(si(t), sC(t)) ≥ ui(1− si(t), sC(t))
1− si(t) otherwise . (2)
Obviously, how agent i calculates her payoff, or more
precisely, the exact form of her payoff matrix Ai in (1),
is critical for the strategy update dynamics. In this paper, we
focus on those Ai with special structures. We require that
the entries of Ai satisfy that
Ti > Ri > max{Si, Pi}. (3)
Payoff matrices with this property correspond to either a
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) or snowdrift (SD) game. Following
the setup in [21], we assume that all the Ai correspond to
either a specific PD game satisfying Pi > Si or correspond
to possible variations of the SD game satisfying Si > Pi. As
it is later shown in Lemma 1, the comparison of the coeffi-
cient Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi with the ratio of cooperators determines
whether agent i changes her strategy when she is chosen
to update. Correspondingly, all SD payoff matrices can be
classified into l > 0 types according to their different values
of the quotients Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi which have to lie strictly in
(0, 1). We call all those agents with the PD payoff matrix the
PD agents. We label all those l types of SD payoff matrices
by 1, . . . , l according to the descending order of magnitude of
the quotients Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi , and call all those agents with the
jth, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, type SD payoff matrix the SDj agents.
Then there are altogether l+1 types among the n agents.
Let nPD denote the number of PD agents and nSDj , j =
1, . . . , l, the number of SDj agents. Then given the initial
conditions of all the agents with their fixed types and initial
strategies, under the best-respond strategy update rule (2),
the type population defined by
p = (nSD1 , nSD2 , . . . , nSDl , nPD)









Given the types SD1, . . . , SDn and PD, the type population
p ∈ Pn and under the update rule (2), denote the number
of cooperators in the population at time t by nC(p, t). We
simplify this notation to nC(t) in Sec. III, when the type
population p is clear. Since we want to know the trends of
the changes of the number of cooperators in the population,
we denote the distributions of the cooperators in different











where each component of the vector is the number of
cooperators in the corresponding type.
In the next section, we first study how the population state
evolves over time and in particular, what its absorbing states
are if there is any.
III. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE POPULATION GAME
We first describe what the absorbing states of the popula-
tion state a(t) look like and then prove that indeed they are
the absorbing states. For the types SD1, . . . , SDl and PD

















where L = {1, . . . , l}, and for j ∈ L, n∗SDj is defined to be
the value of n Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi for the payoff matrix of the SDj
agents. We assume that the following holds
bn∗SDic > dn∗SDi+1e ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}. (4)
Define the following (l + 1)-dimensional row vectors
a∗ := (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , 0, . . . , 0),
a∗− := (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , bn∗SDkp c −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDi , 0, . . . , 0),
a∗+ := (nSD1 , . . . , nSDkp−1 , dn∗SDkp e −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDi , 0, . . . , 0).






















. With the above definitions
in hand, we are ready to present the main stability result of
this section.
Theorem 1: Consider the types SD1, . . . , SDl and PD
and the type population p ∈ Pn. When every agent is
activated independently with a nontrivial probability, under
the update rule (2) and for any initial population state a(0),
there exists some time τ such that almost surely
a(t) ∈ A ∀t ≥ τ. (5)
Note that the theorem implies that the set A is not only
invariant but also globally asymptotically attractive. Accord-
ing to the theorem, there exists some time τ such that for all
t ≥ τ , it holds that









a(t) = a∗ kp = l + 1
.
In other words, after a finite time, almost surely the popula-
tion state reaches a situation where for i ∈ {1, . . . , kp − 1}
all of the SDi agents cooperate, and for i ∈ {kp+1, . . . , l},
all of the SDi agents and also all of the PD agents defect.
Moreover, for kp 6= l+1, if
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp , all of the
SDkp agents defect. If
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
, then in case
a∗+ = a
∗
− or equivalently bn∗SDkp c = dn∗SDkp e, we have
that n∗SDkp −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi of the SDkp agents cooperate
and the rest defect. However, in case a∗+ 6= a∗−, then the
number of SDkp agents who cooperate, belongs to the set
{bn∗SDkp c −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi , dn∗SDkp e −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi}. It can
be shown that the number actually fluctuates between the
elements of this set, which is omitted here due to page limit.
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is as follows
according to a sequence of lemmas to be developed. Note
that due to page limit, we omit the proofs of most of the
lemmas. First the case kp 6= l+1 is considered. In Lemma 2
it is shown that A is an invariant set. Then through Lemmas
3 and 4 it is shown that if the number of cooperators in the
population is greater or smaller than the number of coopera-
tors indicated inA, it will return to the number indicated inA
after a finite time. In addition, with the help of Lemmas 5 and
6 it is proven that all of the SD1, SD2, . . . , SDkp−1 agents
will become cooperators after a finite number of time steps,
and will not change their strategies afterwards. Similarly
it can be shown that all of the SDkp+1, SDkp+2, . . . , SDl
agents will become defectors after a finite time, and will not
change their strategies afterwards. Finally in view of all the
proven facts, one can prove that a reaches and remains in A
after a finite time. We skip the discussion for the case when
kp = l + 1 due to page limit.
To carry out the proof, we need to determine the best
response of each type of agents to the average population
sC . Define βi(sC(t)), the best-reply(response) for player i to
the average population at time t, as the set of pure strategies
k ∈ {C,D} such that no other pure strategy gives her a
higher payoff against sC(t):
βi(sC) ={
k ∈ {C,D} : ui(k, sC) ≥ ui(x, sC) ∀x ∈ {C,D}
}
Clearly, the best reply of each agent is completely determined
by her type. We use βX(sC(t)) to denote the best response
of an X-type agent to the average population at time t.
Lemma 1: For any time t ≥ 0, the best response of a PD
agent is
βPD(sC(t)) = {D}
and the best response of an SDj agent, j ∈ {1 . . . l}, is
βSDj (sC(t)) =

{C} nC(t) < n∗SDj
{C,D} nC(t) = n∗SDj
{D} nC(t) > n∗SDj
. (6)
Proof: For the PD agents it is clear that the best
response is always to defect according to their payoff matrix
which is a PD payoff matrix. For an SDj agent, in order
to calculate the best reply, we have to find the pure strategy
k such that ui(k, sC) is maximized. From the definition of
ui(·, ·), this is equivalent to player i choosing the maximum








(Ri − Si)xC + Si
(Ti − Pi)xC + Pi
]
. (7)
Comparing the two entries of the final right-hand vector
determines the best response
βi(sj) =

{C} (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)xC > Pi − Si
{C,D} (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)xC = Pi − Si
{D} (Ri + Pi − Ti − Si)xC < Pi − Si
.
(8)
Now according to (3) and the fact that Ai is an SD payoff






Ri − Ti + Pi − Si < 0
Pi − Si < 0
.
Hence, in view of (8), we have that
βSDj (sC) =

{C} xC < Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi
{C,D} xC = Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi
{D} xC > Si−PiTi−Ri+Si−Pi
.
Multiplying the conditions in n completes the proof.
As can be seen from the lemma, the best response of the
PD agents is always to defect. So if any of these agents is
chosen to update her strategy at some time, she updates to
D and in case her strategy was already D in the previous
time step, she sticks to it. Now since each agent is chosen
with a nonzero probability at all time, after some finite time,
almost surely all of the PD agents get the chance to update
their strategies. Hence, after a finite time tPD, almost surely
(a.s.) all of the PD agents become defectors. Moreover, they
do not change their strategies afterwards. Hence, a.s.
a(t) = (nCSD1(t), n
C
SD2(t), . . . , n
C
SDl
(t), 0) ∀t ≥ tPD.
4539
In the rest of this section, we consider the situation when all
of the PD agents have already become defectors. That is,
all time t are considered to be non-less than tPD.
In the rest of the proofs we make use of the following





SDj ∀j < kp. (9)
Now we claim that A is an invariant set under the myopic
best response update rule.
Lemma 2: Let kp 6= l+1. If
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp , then
in case the population state vector a(t) reaches a∗ at some
time tr, it will remain there afterwards, i.e.,
(∃tr : a(tr) = a∗)⇒ (a(t) = a∗ ∀t ≥ tr) . (10)
On the other hand, if
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
, then in case
the population state a(t) reaches the set {a∗−, a∗+} at some




j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp be in force. According




nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp ≥ bn∗SDkp c. (12)
Now let
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
be in force. According to
the definitions of a∗− and a
∗




nSDj + (bn∗SDkp c −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDj ) ≥ bn∗SDkp c.




SDi ∀i > kp
(6)
=⇒ βSDi(sC(tr)) = {D} ∀i > kp.
Hence, if any SDi agent, i > kp, is chosen at tr while her
strategy is D at tr, she will not change her strategy at tr+1.
On the other hand, all SDi agents, i > kp, were already
defecting at tr according to the definition of A. Hence,
nCSDi(tr + 1) = n
C
SDi(tr) = 0 ∀i > kp. (13)
Now we consider the rest of the types. Let
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥











j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
be in force. According to
the definitions of a∗− and a
∗




nSDj + (dn∗SDkp e −
kp−1∑
j=1
nSDj ) ≤ dn∗SDkp e
(4)
=⇒ nC(tr) < n∗SDkp−1 .




SDi ∀i < kp
(6)
=⇒ βSDi(sC(tr)) = {C} ∀i < kp.
Hence, if any SDi agent, i < kp, is chosen at tr while her
strategy is C at tr, she will not change her strategy at tr+1.
On the other hand, all SDi agents, i < kp, were already
defecting at tr according to the definition of A. Hence,
nCSDi(tr + 1) = n
C
SDi(tr) = nSDi ∀i < kp. (14)
Now consider the SDkp agents. Let
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥
n∗SDkp be in force. Based on the definition of a
∗, the
following holds
nCSDkp (tr) = 0. (15)
On the other hand, according to (12),
nC(tr) ≥ n∗SDkp ⇒ βSDkp (sC(tr)) = {D}.
Hence, due to (15),




In view of (13) and (14), the above equation results in
(∃tr : a(tr) = a∗)⇒ (a(tr + 1) = a∗) .
Consequently, (10) can be proven by induction.
Now let
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp










If nCSDkp (tr) = bn∗SDkp c −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi = dn∗SDkp e −∑kp−1




. Hence, the best reply for all of the SDkp
agents at tr is {C,D}. Hence, if an SDkp agent is chosen
at tr to update her strategy, she will not change her strategy.
Hence,




= bn∗SDkp c −
kp−1∑
j=1




If nCSDkp (tr) = dn∗SDkp e −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi and dn∗SDkp e 6=
n∗SDkp , then
nC(tr) = dn∗SDkp e > n∗SDkp
(6)
=⇒ βSDkp (sC(tr)) = {D}.
Hence, when an SDkp agent is chosen at tr, we have that
nCSDkp (tr + 1) = n
C
SDkp





If nCSDkp (tr) = bn∗SDkp c −
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDi and bn∗SDkp c 6=
n∗SDkp , then
nC(tr) = bn∗SDkp c < n∗SDkp
(6)
=⇒ βSDkp (sC(tr)) = {C}.
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Hence, when an SDkp agent is chosen at tr, we have that
nCSDkp (tr + 1) = n
C
SDkp





Moreover, in general, when the chosen agent at tr is not an
SDkp agent, we have that














In view of (13) and (14), the above equation results in(∃tr : a(tr) ∈ {a∗−, a∗+})⇒ (a(tr + 1) ∈ {a∗−, a∗+}) .
Consequently, (11) can be proven by induction, which com-
pletes the proof. 
The time when the number of cooperators in the popu-
lation equals that in A, plays a key role in the rest of the
proof. Hence, we proceed with the following definition. For















The following two lemmas are used to show that B is infinite.
In Lemma 3 it is shown that if the number of cooperators
nC exceeds the maximum number of cooperators in A at
some time t, it will return to the number of cooperators in
A after some finite time. The same is shown to happen in
Lemma 4 when nC becomes less than the minimum number
of cooperators in A.
Lemma 3: Let kp 6= l+1. If
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp , then












j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
, then in case at some
time t,
nC(t) > dn∗SDkp e,
then a.s. there exists some natural number t1 such that
nC(t+ t1) ∈
{bn∗SDkp c, dn∗SDkp e}.
Lemma 4: Let kp 6= l+1. If
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj ≥ n∗SDkp , then












j=1 nSDj < n
∗
SDkp
, then in case at some
time t,
nC(t) < bn∗SDkp c,
then a.s. there exists some natural number t1 such that
nC(t+ t1) ∈
{bn∗SDkp c, dn∗SDkp e}.
According to Lemmas 3 and 4, the set B is infinite.
Now we define a function that is monotone in B, and later
use it to prove convergence to A. First define α(t) as the
greatest nonnegative number at t that satisfies the following
conditions
nCSDj (t) = nSDj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , α(t)}, (20)
α(t) ≤ kp − 2. (21)





Note that according to the definition, the maximum of h is∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj . The next two lemmas are required to show
that h(t) reaches its maximum value
∑kp−1
j=1 nSDj .
Lemma 5: Let kp 6= l+1. For tb ∈ B, the following holds
h(t) ≥ h(tb) ∀t ≥ tb. (23)






then a.s. there exists some time tr ∈ B, tr > tq such that
h(tr) > h(tq). (25)
Now the proof of Th. 1 can be done using the monotone
property of h, which we avoid here due to space limitation.
After gaining insight into what the absorbing states are
for the type population dynamics, as control engineers, we
want to know whether we can shift the absorbing states and
thus “control” the dynamics. In the next section, we present
some of the ideas.
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IV. CONTROLLING THE NUMBER OF COOPERATORS
Now that we know the behavior of the population game
after a sufficiently long time, we are interested in inves-
tigating whether it is possible to control the number of
cooperators in the final state While there may be several
ways to achieve this goal, e.g., adding some agents to the
population, fixing the strategies of some of the agents to C or
D, etc., perhaps the most natural parameter to control, which
makes the least changes to the structure of the population
game, is the type of each agent. Changing the type of an
agent can be done by modifying the parameter(s) of her
payoff matrix. By changing the types of a group of agents,
a new type population is acquired which leads to a possibly
new number of cooperators in the final state. Note that since
the log run behavior of the population state is independent
from the initial strategies of the agents, it does not matter
when and in what order the changes in the types are done.
For sake of simplicity we assume that they all happen at time
t = 0. So the question we attack is how to set the number
of cooperators in the long run to some reference value r by
changing the types of a group of agents at some time step
t = 0.
Each set of changes in the types of the agents results in
some type population p. Moreover, if we know that type
population p under which the number of cooperators a.s.
equals the reference value for all time greater than some
constant τ , we also know the type of which agent should
be changed to what, by just comparing the original type
population ξ with p. For r ∈ Z≥0 and a population of size
n, define F(r, n) as the set of all feasible type-populations
p ∈ Pn such that under the updater rule (2), the number
of cooperators a.s. equals r for all time greater than some
constant τ , i.e.,
F(r, n) := {p | p ∈ Pn, (∃τ : nC(p, t) = r ∀t ≥ τ)}.
Our goal is to determine F(r, n). Then it becomes clear how
the types of the agents must change to have r cooperators in
the long run. We need the following sets for a given n ∈ N,
r ∈ Z≥0 and b ∈ {1, . . . , l + 1}:
Fb1(r, n) :=
{














Theorem 2: Consider the types SD1, . . . , SDl and PD.
Given r ∈ Dn,
1) if there exists b ∈ {2, . . . , l} such that n∗SDb−1 > r >
n∗SDb , then F(r, n) = Fb1(r, n);
2) if there exists b ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that r = n∗SDb , thenF(r, n) = Fb1(r, n) ∪ Fb2(r, n);
3) if r ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,min{dn∗SDle − 1, n}}, then
F(r, n) = F l+11 (r, n).
We skip the proof due to page limit.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied a finite heterogeneous population of
game-playing agents under the myopic best response update
rule. We have shown that based on the distribution of the
types in the population, the total number of cooperators in
the long run either reaches a certain steady state or fluctuates
between two constants. Moreover, we have investigated how
to control the number of cooperators, and in particular, for
a given population and types, we show how to change the
types of the agents to reach a desired number of cooperators
in the long run.
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